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We present a process algebra for specifying and reasoning about quantum security protocols. Since
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1 Introduction
Security protocols are, in general, composed by several agents running in par-
allel, where each agent computes information (bounded by polynomial-time
on the security parameter) and exchange it with other agents. In the context
of quantum processes, the computation is bounded by quantum polynomial-
time and the information exchanged is supported by qubits. In this paper, the
problem of deﬁning quantum security properties is addressed using a quantum
polynomial-time process algebra. This approach is highly inspired in [13,9].
The computational model we adopt to deﬁne quantum polynomial terms
is based on the logarithmic cost random access machine [4]. A hybrid model,
using both classic and quantum memory, similar to [6] but with complexity
assumptions, is considered and it is shown to be (polynomial-time) equivalent
to a uniform family of quantum circuits (which are, by themselves, equivalent
to quantum Turing machines). Such machines model the computation of each
agent, receive qubits as input, and return qubits as output.
Thanks to the non-cloning theorem, quantum information cannot be copied
without prior knowledge of its state. This observation imposes some design
options in the process algebra, since it is necessary to know which agent pos-
sesses a qubit in order to know who can retrieve each piece of information.
In order to deal with this fact, a set of agents is ﬁxed and the qubits are
partitioned among them.
Although several other approaches to quantum process algebras are al-
ready present in the literature (see [5], for instance), ours is quite original,
due to the universe of application—security protocols. In our approach, pro-
cess terms are divided into local and global. An agent is modelled by a local
process while a protocol is modelled by a global process so, a global pro-
cess corresponds to local processes running in parallel. A semantics based
on probabilistic transition systems (which can be easily translated to Markov
chains) is provided, and the probabilistic transitions are deﬁned using rules
and assuming a uniform scheduler to resolve non-deterministic choices.
Agent observation is deﬁned as a probability distribution over binary words
obtained by measuring on the computational basis (some of) the agent’s
qubits. This measurement is done at the end of a protocol run. This con-
cept is the key ingredient to establish observational equivalence that, in the
context of security protocols, is based on computational indistinguishability
[14]. Intuitively, two process terms are observational equivalent for an agent if,
after making all possible reductions to each process, it is impossible to distin-
guish (in quantum polynomial-time) the qubits of the agent on both processes.
Since we internalize quantum polynomial-time machines in the process alge-
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bra language, observational equivalence is easily deﬁned and it is shown to be
a congruence relation.
One of the most successful ways for deﬁning secure concurrent crypto-
graphic tasks is via process emulation [1,2]. This deﬁnitional job boils down
to the following: a process realizes a cryptographic task if and only if it emu-
lates an ideal process that is known to realize such task. Based on the notion of
observational equivalence, we establish the notion of emulation for the quan-
tum process calculus and show that it is compositional. Finally, we provide
the notion of quantum zero-knowledge via process emulation.
In Section 2 the process algebra is introduced together with the logarithmic
cost random access machine. Both the syntax and the semantics of the process
algebra are clearly established, and the section is concluded by presenting the
notion of observational equivalence. Section 3 is devoted to emulation and
its composition theorem, and ﬁnally, in Section 4 quantum zero-knowledge is
deﬁned using process emulation.
2 Process Algebra
In the context of security protocols it is common to consider a security pa-
rameter η ∈ N. In the case of quantum protocols we will also consider such
parameter in order to bound the quantum complexity of the principals and
adversaries. From now on, the symbol η is reserved to designate such security
parameter. The role of this parameter is twofold: it bounds to a polynomial
on η the number of qubits that can be sent through channels, and it bounds
all the computation to quantum polynomial time (on η). We now detail these
aspects culminating with the presentation of the process algebra language.
2.1 Quantum polynomial machines
The computational model we adopted to deﬁne quantum polynomial machine
is based on the logarithmic cost random access machine [4] and it is quite simi-
lar to the quantum random access machine in [6]. We consider a hybrid model
using both classic and quantum memory. In order to cope with a countable
set of qubits qB we adopt the following Hilbert space H (isomorphic to 2(2qB)
and L2(2qB,#)) to model the quantum state (see [10,11] for a discussion on
why H is the correct Hilbert space for modelling a countable set of qubits):
• each element is a map |ψ〉 : 2qB → C such that:
· supp(|ψ〉) = {v ∈ 2qB : |ψ〉(v) = 0} is countable;
·
∑
v∈2qB
||ψ〉(v)|2 =
∑
v∈supp(|ψ〉)
||ψ〉(v)|2 < ∞;
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• |ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉 = λv. |ψ1〉(v) + |ψ2〉(v);
• z|ψ〉 = λv. z|ψ〉(v);
• 〈ψ1|ψ2〉 =
∑
v∈V
|ψ1〉(v) |ψ2〉(v).
The inner product induces the norm |||ψ〉|| =
√
〈ψ|ψ〉 and so, the distance
d(|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉) = |||ψ1〉 − |ψ2〉||. Clearly, {|v〉 : v ∈ 2
qB} is an orthonormal basis
of H where |v〉(v) = 1 and |v〉(v′) = 0 for every v′ = v. This basis is called
the computational or logic basis of H.
A conﬁguration of a quantum random access machine (QRAM) is triple
ξ = (m, |ψ〉, s) where m ∈ NN, |ψ〉 ∈ H and s ∈ N. The ﬁrst component of
the triple represents the classical memory of the machine—an inﬁnite sequence
of natural numbers, the second component represents the quantum state of
the machine, and ﬁnally the third component is a counter that indicates how
many (qu)bit operations are allowed.
We associate to each QRAM a positive polynomial q for bounding the
number of allowed (qu)bit operations to q(η). In this way, we force each
QRAM to terminate in polynomial-time. Given a ﬁnite set of qubits at state
|ϕ〉, the initial conﬁguration of the QRAM is the triple ξ0(|ϕ〉) = (m0, |ϕ〉 ⊗
|0〉, q(η)), where the sequence m0 is such that m0(k) = 0 for all k ∈ N and |0〉
is the unit vector in H such that |0〉(∅) = 1 (note that if Q is a 2n dimension
Hilbert space, then there is a canonical isomorphism between H and Q⊗H,
and therefore |ϕ〉⊗ |0〉 ∈ Q⊗H can be seen as a unit vector in H). A QRAM
receives as input a ﬁnite sequence of qubits, but since it is always possible to
encode classical bits in qubits this is not a limitation.
The set of atomic commands AC, and their associated cost is presented in
the table below 6 .
6 We denote the number of bits required to represent a natural number n by |n|.
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Number Instruction Computational cost
1 Ri = n |n|
2 Ri = Rj |Rj |
3 Ri = Rj + Rk |Rj |+ |Rk|
4 Ri = Rj − Rk |Rj |+ |Rk|
5 Ri = RjRk |Rj | × |Rk|
6 Ri = Rj/Rk |Rj | × |Rk|
7 Ri = RRj |Rj |+ |RRj |
8 RRi = Rj |Ri|+ |Rj |
9 PauliX [b] 1
10 PauliY [b] 1
11 PauliZ [b] 1
12 Hadamard[b] 1
13 phase[b] 1
14 π
8
[b] 1
15 c-not[b1, b2] 1
16 measure[b] → Ri 1
Most of the commands above are self-explanatory, but it is worthwhile to
notice that all commands are deterministic with exception of measure. In-
deed, according to the measurement postulates of quantum mechanics (see for
instance [3]), when a quantum system is measured the outcome is stochastic,
and moreover the state evolves accordingly to this outcome. Note that we only
consider measurements over the computational basis, nevertheless this is not
a limitation since any other qubit measurement can be performed by applying
a unitary transformation before measuring the qubit over the computational
basis.
The set of QRAM commands C is obtained inductively as follows:
(i) a ∈ C if a ∈ AC;
(ii) c1; c2 ∈ C if c1, c2 ∈ C;
(iii) (if (Rn > 0) then c) ∈ C if c ∈ C;
(iv) (while (Rn > 0) c) ∈ C if c ∈ C.
The execution of a QRAM command c is a stochastic function between
conﬁgurations. Let Ξ = NN × H × N be the set of all conﬁgurations, and
Probﬁn(Ξ) be the set of all probability measures over (Ξ, 2
Ξ) such that only a
ﬁnite set of conﬁgurations have probability diﬀerent from 0. The execution of
a QRAM command c is a map runc : Ξ→ Probﬁn(Ξ), and we write [c] ξ →p ξ
′
to denote that Prrunc(ξ)(ξ
′) = p. The execution of QRAM commands can be
deﬁned using the following rules, which are quite intuitive:
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s ≥ |n|
[Ri = n] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m′, |ψ〉, s− |n|)
(Ri = n),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = n;
s ≥ |Rj |
[Ri = Rj ] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m′, |ψ〉, s− |Rj|)
(Ri = Rj),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = m(j);
s ≥ |Rj|+ |Rk|
[Ri = Rj + Rk] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m′, |ψ〉, s− (|Rj|+ |Rk|))
(Ri = Rj + Rk),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = m(j) +m(k);
s ≥ |Rj|+ |Rk|
[Ri = Rj − Rk] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m′, |ψ〉, s− (|Rj|+ |Rk|))
(Ri = Rj −Rk),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = max(m(j)−m(k), 0);
s ≥ |Rj| × |Rk|
[Ri = RjRk] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m′, |ψ〉, s− (|Rj| × |Rk|))
(Ri = RjRk),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = m(j)m(k);
s ≥ |Rj| × |Rk|
[Ri = Rj/Rk] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m′, |ψ〉, s− (|Rj| × |Rk|))
(Ri = Rj/Rk),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = m(j)/m(k);
s ≥ |Rj|+ |RRj |
[Ri = RRj ] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m
′, |ψ〉, s− (|Rj |+ |RRj |))
(Ri = RRj ),
where m′(k) = m′(k) for all k = i and m′(i) = m(m(j));
s ≥ |Ri|+ |Rj|
[RRi = Rj ] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m
′, |ψ〉, s− (|Ri|+ |Rj|))
(RRi = Rj),
where m′(k) = m(k) for all k = m(i) and m′(m(i)) = m(j);
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s ≥ 1
[PauliX [b]] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m, |ψ′〉, s− 1)
(PauliX [b]),
where |ψ′〉 is obtained from |ψ〉 by applying the PauliX operator
⎡
⎣ 0 1
1 0
⎤
⎦ on
qubit b. Similar rules apply to the following one-qubit operators:
PauliY
⎡
⎣ 0 −i
i 0
⎤
⎦; PauliZ
⎡
⎣ 1 0
0 −1
⎤
⎦;
Hadamard 1√
2
⎡
⎣ 1 1
1 −1
⎤
⎦; Phase
⎡
⎣ 1 0
0 i
⎤
⎦; π
8
⎡
⎣ 1 0
0 eiπ/4
⎤
⎦;
s ≥ 1
[c-not[b1, b2]] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m, |ψ′〉, s− 1)
(c-not[b1, b2]),
where |ψ′〉 is obtained from |ψ〉 by applying the control-not operator
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
on qubits b1 and b2;
s ≥ 1
[measure[b] → Ri] (m, |ψ〉, s) →p (m′, |ψ′〉, s− 1))
(measure[b] → Ri = 0),
where |ψ′〉 is equal to P0|ψ〉|P0|ψ〉| , p = |P0|ψ〉| (P0 is the projector onto the subspace
of H where qubit b takes value |0〉), m′(i) = 0 and m′(j) = m(j) for all j = i;
s ≥ 1
[measure[b] → Ri] (m, |ψ〉, s) →p (m′, |ψ′〉, s− 1))
(measure[b] → Ri = 1),
where |ψ′〉 is equal to P1|ψ〉|P1|ψ〉| , p = |P1|ψ〉| (P1 is the projector onto the subspace
of H where qubit b takes value |1〉), m′(i) = 1 and m′(j) = m(j) for all j = i;
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[c1] (m, |ψ〉, s) →p1 (m
′, |ψ′〉, s′) [c2] (m′, |ψ′〉, s′) →p2 (m
′′, |ψ′′〉, s′′)
[c1; c2] (m, |ψ〉, s) →p1×p2 (m′′, |ψ′′〉, s′′)
(c1; c2);
m(n) > 0 s ≥ |Rn| [c] (m, |ψ〉, s− |Rn|) →p (m
′, |ψ′〉, s′)
[(if (Rn > 0) then c)] (m, |ψ〉, s) →p [c] (m′, |ψ′〉, s′)
(if);
m(n) = 0
[(if (Rn > 0) then c)] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m, |ψ〉, s)
(if⊥);
m(n) > 0 s ≥ |Rn|
[c; (while (Rn > 0) c)] (m, |ψ〉, s− |Rn|) →p (m
′, |ψ′〉, s′)
[(while (Rn > 0) c)] (m, |ψ〉, s) →p (m′, |ψ′〉, s′)
(while);
m(n) = 0
[(while (Rn > 0) c)] (m, |ψ〉, s) →1 (m, |ψ〉, s− |Rn|)
(while⊥).
Observe, that the reduction of QRAM commands always terminate, since
every computation is bounded by q(η) (qu)bit steps. The execution of a
QRAM command can be seen as a word run of a quantum automaton [8],
however a detailed discussion about this subject is out of the scope of this
abstract.
The output of a QRAM is the quantum state of a set of qubits. This
output set is determined by another positive polynomial o associated to the
machine. Given a security parameter η, the set of output qubits is constituted
by the ﬁrst o(η) qubits.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A quantum polynomial machine is a triple M = (c, q, o) where
c is a QRAM command, q is a positive step bounding polynomial and o is a
positive output polynomial. We denote the set of all these triples by QPM.
Given a quantum polynomial machine M and a security parameter η, the
computation of M over state |ψ〉 is the probability distribution over the state of
the ﬁrst o(η) qubits of |ψ′〉, where this distribution is deﬁned by the execution
rules [c](m0, |ψ〉, q(η)) →p (m
′, |ψ′〉, s′). Hence, the computation of a QRAM
is a probability distribution over the state space of the ﬁrst o(η) qubits. It
is traditional in quantum algorithms to measure all relevant qubits at the
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end of the computation in order to obtain a classical result (see Shor’s and
Grover’s algorithms). However, since we use QRAM to compute quantum
information that can be sent through quantum channels, we do not impose this
ﬁnal measurement since it may be desirable to send a superposition through
a quantum channel.
The following result asserts that the QRAM model is equivalent to the
usual quantum circuit computational model (a careful presentation of this
result is out of the scope of this abstract).
Proposition 2.2 For any uniform family of polynomial quantum circuits Q =
{Qη}η∈N, there exists a quantum polynomial machine MQ such that the MQ
computes the same stochastic function as Q. Moreover, for any quantum
polynomial machine M there exists an equivalent uniform family of polynomial
quantum circuits QM = {Qη}η∈N.
Proof (Sketch): Note that a uniform circuit uses precisely the gates deﬁned
as quantum atomic commands of the QRAM. The construction of the circuit
can be mimicked by a RAM command c. Since this construction must be poly-
nomial in η, the program must terminate in polynomial time and therefore,
there is a polynomial q to bound the number of steps, ﬁnally the output must
always be a polynomial set of qubits, and therefore we are able to construct
an equivalent QRAM machine.
On the other hand a QRAM program is the realization of the uniform
family construction, since, for each η, a circuit can be retrieved by looking
at the ﬁnite (do not forget that QRAM programs always terminate) sequence
of quantum atomic gates generated by the execution of the command. The
stochastic nature of the execution does not bring a problem, since gates placed
after a measurement can be controlled by the outcome of that measurement.
If a measurement gives the value 1 to a qubit and in that case a gate U is
placed at some qubit b, then the circuit should be constructed by placing a
control-U gate controlled by the measured qubit and targeted at b. 
2.2 Process algebra
As stated before, we require to know who possesses a qubit in order to know
who can retrieve some piece of information. In order to deal with this fact, a
qubit is considered to belong to some agent, and therefore, the set of qubits
qB is partitioned among all agents. To make this more precise, a countable
set A = {a1, . . . , ak, . . . } of agents is ﬁxed once and for all, and moreover the
partition qB = {qBai}ai∈A of qB is such that each set qBai is countable and
recursively enumerable.
Note that each qBai has a total order (with a bottom element) induced by
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its recursive enumeration. The purpose of this total ordering is to re-index
the qubits accessed by a QPM M when an agent a executes M . An obvious
desideratum of the system is that an agent a is restricted to compute over its
own qubits qBa, and therefore, when agent a executes a quantum polynomial
machine M , this machine must have access only to the qubits in qBa (note that
if the qubits of a are entangled with other qubits, then when the former are
modiﬁed so can be the latter). Therefore, if, for instance, an agent a executes
a machine that consists of the command PauliX [b], and if qBa is recursively
enumerated by γ, then the command eﬀectively executed is PauliX [γ(b)]. The
same procedure applies to the input and output qubits, so when a machine
executed by a outputs the ﬁrst o(η) qubits, the machine is in fact outputting
the qubits {γ(o(1)), . . . , γ(o(η))} ⊂ qBa ⊆ qB.
Communication between agents is achieved via public channels, allowing
qubits to be exchanged. Clearly, this process is modelled by modifying the
partition of qB. It is also convenient to allow parallelism inside an agent (that
is, an agent may be constituted by several processes in parallel), for this pur-
pose, private channels (that cannot be intercepted) allowing communication
between the agent local processes are introduced. To make this assumptions
clear, two countable disjoint sets of quantum channels are considered, the set
of global or public channels G = {g1, g2, . . . , gk, . . . }, and the set of local or
private channels L = {l1, l2, . . . , lk, . . . }. We denote by C the set G ∪ L. All
global channels can be read and written by an adversary while local channels
correspond to private communication from one agent to itself. One role of
the security parameter is to bound the bandwidth of the channels. Hence, we
introduce a bandwidth map bw : C → q, where q is the set of all polynomials
taking positive values. Given a value η for the security parameter, a channel
c can send at most bw(c)(η) qubits.
We also consider a countable set of variables Var = {x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . .},
which are required to deﬁne qubit terms. A qubit term t is either a ﬁnite
subset of qB or a variable x ∈ Var.
Finally, we present the language of processes, which is a fragment of π-
calculus. Mind that the overall computation must be quantum polynomial on
η and therefore we do not cope with recursion nor mobility. First, we establish
the language of an agent, that we call local process language.
Deﬁnition 2.3 The language of local processes L is obtained inductively as
follows:
(i) 0 ∈ L (termination);
(ii) c〈M(t)〉 ∈ L where M ∈ QPM, t is a qubit term, and c ∈ C (output);
(iii) c(x).Q ∈ L where c ∈ C, x ∈ Var and Q ∈ L (input);
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(iv) [M(t) = 0].Q where M ∈ QPM, t is a qubit term, and Q ∈ L (match);
(v) (Q1|Q2) where Q1, Q2 ∈ L (parallel composition);
(vi) !qQ where Q ∈ L and q ∈ q (bounded replication).
Most of the (local) process terms are intuitive. The output term c〈M(qB′)〉
means that the output of machine M , which received the ﬁnite set of qubits
qB′ as input, is sent through channel c. The input term c(x).Q means that
a set of qubits is going to be received on c, and upon reception, x takes the
value of the received qubits.
After ﬁxing the security parameter η, we can get rid of replication by
evaluating each process !qR as q(η) copies of R in parallel. Therefore, we
always assume that a process term has no replication. Now, as state before,
a protocol is constituted by a set o agents running in parallel, therefore the
global language (or protocol language) is quite simple:
Deﬁnition 2.4 The language of global processes G over a set of agents A is
deﬁned inductively as follows:
(i) 0 ∈ G (global termination);
(ii) P‖(a : Q) ∈ G where P ∈ G, a ∈ A does not occur in P , and Q ∈ L
(global parallel composition).
The following example uses the process language to describe the RSA
cryptanalysis using Shor’s algorithm.
Example 2.5 [Shor’s based RSA cryptanalysis] Let p, q be primes (with η
length binary expansion), and e, d integers such that ed ≡ 1 mod φ(pq). Alice
is a simple process A that knows some message w and outputs we mod pq,
where e is the public key of Bob. This dummy process can be presented as
(a : A(w)) := (a : g〈we mod pq〉).
Bob receives x and computes xd mod pq. This procedure can be modelled by
the following process:
(b : B) := (b : g(x).(l〈xd mod pq〉|l(y).0)).
Therefore the RSA protocol is given by the process (a : A(w))‖(b : B). Fi-
nally, we can write the “attacking” process, Eve. She factorises pq, inverts e
mod φ(pq) (thus, allowing her to ﬁnd d), and intercepts the message sent by
Alice (on channel g). We write this process as follows:
(c : l1〈Shor(pq)〉|l1(y).l2〈Inv(y, e)〉|g(x).l2(z).(l3〈x
z mod pq〉|l3(w).0)).
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2.3 Semantics
In order to deﬁne the semantics of a local process we need to introduce the
notion of local conﬁguration. A local conﬁguration or agent conﬁguration is
a triple (|ψ〉, qBa, Q) where |ψ〉 ∈ H, qBa ⊆ qB is a countable, recursive
enumerable set and Q ∈ L. The ﬁrst element of the local conﬁguration is the
global state of the protocol, the second element is the set of qubits the agent
possesses and the last element is the local process term.
The semantics of a local process is a probabilistic transition system where
the transitions are deﬁned by rules. We use (|ψ〉, qBa, Q) →p (|ψ
′〉, qBa, Q′)
to state that, at global state |ψ〉, when agent a possesses qubits qBa, the
local process Q is reduced to Q′ and global state is modiﬁed to |ψ′〉 with
probability p. It is also worthwhile to observe that we use the notation
M(|ψ〉, qBa, qB1) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB2) to denote that the execution of the QRM
M , operating on qBa (that is, using the recursive enumeration of qBa to re-
index the position of the qubits), and receiving as input qB1, outputs qB2
and modiﬁes the global state |ψ〉 to |ψ′〉 with probability p. For the case of
local processes, the sets qB1 and qB2 are irrelevant, because the qubits owned
by the agent remain the same when a local communication (LCom rule) is
applied. Their functionality will be clear when we present the global rules.
M(|ψ〉, qBa, qB1) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB2) qB1, qB2 ⊆ qBa |qB2| ≤ bw(l)(η)
(|ψ〉, qBa, l(x).Q|l〈M(qB1)〉) →p (|ψ′〉, qBa, QxqB2)
(LCom)
We also introduce the term M ;Meas to denote the machine that, after ex-
ecuting M performs a measurement on the computational basis of the output
qubits of M . So a match corresponds to performing a measurement on the
output qubits of M and checking whether the result is the 0 word.
(M ;Meas)(|ψ〉, qBa, qB1) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB2) |ψ′〉|qB2 = |0〉
(|ψ〉, qBa, [M(qB1) = 0].Q) →p (|ψ′〉, qBa, Q)
(Match)
(M ;Meas)(|ψ〉, qBa, qB1) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB2) |ψ′〉|qB2 = |0〉
(|ψ〉, qBa, [M(qB1) = 0].Q) →p (|ψ′〉, qBa, 0)
(Match⊥)
The remaining rules are self-explanatory.
(|ψ〉, qBa, P ) →p (|ψ
′〉, qBa, P ′)
(|ψ〉, qBa, P |Q) →p (|ψ′〉, qBa, P ′|Q)
(LLPar)
(|ψ〉, qBa, Q) →p (|ψ
′〉, qBa, Q′)
(|ψ〉, qBa, P |Q)→p (|ψ′〉, qBa, P |Q′)
(LRPar)
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We proceed by presenting the global rules. A global conﬁguration is a triple
(|ψ〉, qB, P ) where |ψ〉 ∈ H, qB = {qBa}a∈A is a partition of qB indexed by
the set of agents A (where each qBa is countable and r.e.) and P ∈ G. The
semantics of a global process is deﬁned by the following rules:
(|ψ〉, qBa, Q) →p (|ψ
′〉, qBa, Q′)
(|ψ〉, qB, (a : Q)) →p (|ψ′〉, qB, (a : Q))
(LtoG)
M(|ψ〉, qBb, qB1) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB2) qB1, qB2 ⊆ qBb |qB2| ≤ bw(g)(η)
(|ψ〉, qB, (a : g(x).Q)‖(b : g〈M(qB1)〉)) →p (|ψ′〉, qB′, (a : QxqB2))
(GCom)
where qB′ = {qB′a}a∈A, qB
′
a = qBa ∪ qB2, qB
′
b = qBb \ qB2, and qB
′
c = qBc
for all c = a, b.
(|ψ〉, qB, P1) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB′, P ′1)
(|ψ〉, qB, P1‖P2) →p (|ψ′〉, qB′, P ′1‖P2)
(GLPar)
(|ψ〉, qB, P2) →p (|ψ
′〉, qB′, P ′2)
(|ψ〉, qB, P1‖P2) →p (|ψ′〉, qB′, P1‖P ′2)
(GRPar).
All the rules are very simple to grasp. The only non trivial rule is global
communication (GCom), that makes qubits to be exchanged from one agent
to another, and therefore an adjustment is required in the qubit partition.
Process term reductions are non-deterministic, in the sense that several
diﬀerent reductions could be chosen at some step. In order to be possible
to make a quantitative analysis, this reduction should be probabilistic. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume a uniform scheduler, that is, the choice on
any possible reduction is done with uniform probability over all possible non-
deterministic reductions. We do not present in detail the scheduler model
but, in principle, any probability distribution modelled by a QPM can be
used to model the scheduler policy. Finally, note that by applying local and
global rules, and assuming a uniform scheduler, one can deﬁne the many step
reduction →∗p such that (|ψ1〉, qB1, P1) →
∗
p (|ψn〉, qBn, Pn), whenever:
• (|ψ1〉, qB1, P1) →p1 (|ψ2〉, qB2, P2) →p2 · · · →pn−1 (|ψn〉, qBn, Pn);
• p = p1
R1
× p2
R2
×· · ·× pn−1
Rn−1
where Ri is the number of possible non-deterministic
choices for (|ψi〉, qBi, Pi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1};
• (|ψn〉, qBn, Pn) cannot be reduced any more.
The many step reduction takes into account the scheduler choice, by weighting
each stochastic reduction pi with yet another probability
1
Ri
, where Ri is the
number of possible non-deterministic choices at step i.
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2.4 Observations and observational equivalence
At the end of a protocol, each agent a ∈ A is allowed to measure a polynomial
(in η) number of qubits in qBa to extract information. We can always assume
that these qubits are the ﬁrst, say, r(η) qubits of qBa where r is a positive
polynomial. Therefore, the many step reduction of a process term P induces a
probability distribution on 2r(η), where 2r(η) is the set of all possible outcomes
of r(η) qubits when measured over the computational basis (that is, 2r(η) is
the set of all r(η)-long binary words).
Deﬁnition 2.6 Given a positive polynomial r and a global conﬁguration
(|ψ〉, qB, P ), let
Γ(|ψ〉,qB,P ) = {(|ψ
′〉, qB′, P ′) : (|ψ〉, qB, P ) →∗p (|ψ
′〉, qB′, P ′) and p > 0}.
We deﬁne the observation of an agent a to be the family of probability mea-
sures
Oar = {(2
r(η), 22
r(η)
,Prar(η))}η∈N
where:
• Prar(η)({w}) =
∑
γ∈Γ(|ψ〉,qB,P ) pγ × |〈w|ψγ〉|;
• pγ is such that (|ψ〉, qB, P ) →∗pγ γ;
• |ψγ〉 is the ﬁrst component of γ;
• |〈w|ψγ〉| is the probability of observing the r(η)-long binary word w by
measuring the r(η) ﬁrst qubits of qBa (qubits in possession of agent a) of
|ψγ〉 in the computational basis.
Note that the summation used to compute Prar(η)({w}) is well deﬁned, since
Γ(|ψ〉,qB,P ) is ﬁnite. It is clear at this point,that an observation of an agent is
a random r(η)-long binary word, with distribution given by Prar(η).
The notion of observational equivalence we adopt is based on computa-
tional indistinguishability as usual in the security community [13]. First, we
introduce the concept of context. The set of global contexts C is deﬁned in-
ductively as follows: [ ] ∈ C; C[ ]‖P and P‖C[ ] ∈ C provided that C[ ] ∈ C
and P ∈ G. Given a context C[ ] and a global process P , the notation C[P ]
means that we substitute the process P for the [ ] in C[ ].
Deﬁnition 2.7 Let P and P ′ be process terms. We say that P is computa-
tionally indistinguishable by agent a from P ′ if and only if for every context
C[ ], polynomials q and r, |ψ〉 ∈ H, partition qB of qB, η suﬃciently large
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and binary word w ∈ 2r(η),
|Prar(η)(w)− Pr
′a
r(η)(w)| ≤
1
q(η)
where Prar(η) is given by the observation of a for conﬁguration (|ψ〉, qB, C[P ])
and Pr′ar(η) is given by the observation of a for conﬁguration (|ψ〉, qB, C[P
′]).
In such case we write P  P ′.
Two processes are computationally indistinguishable if they are indistin-
guishable by contexts, that is, for any input (here modelled by |ψ〉 and qB),
there is no context which can distinguish, up to a negligible function, the
outputs produced. The deﬁnition above extends the classical deﬁnition of
computational indistinguishability to the quantum case, since processes can
be modelled by quantum polynomial machines and therefore C[ ] induces the
required distinguishing machine. A detailed proof of this result is out of the
scope of this extended abstract.
In order to set up compositionality, the following result is of the utmost
importance:
Proposition 2.8 Computational indistinguishability is a congruence relation
with respect to the parallel primitive of G.
Proof. Both symmetry and reﬂexivity are trivial to check. Transitivity fol-
lows by triangular inequality, and taking into account that 1
2
q(n) is a polyno-
mial. Congruence on the global parallel operator follows by noticing that for
any contexts C[ ] and C ′[ ], C ′[C[ ]] is also a context. 
3 Emulation and Composition Theorem
One of the most successful ways for deﬁning secure concurrent cryptographic
tasks is via process emulation [1,2]. This deﬁnitional job boils down to the
following: a process realizes a cryptographic task if and only if it emulates an
ideal process that is known to realize such task. In this section, guided by the
goal of deﬁning secure functionalities, we detail the notion of emulation for
the quantum process calculus deﬁned in the previous section.
Let I be an ideal protocol that realizes (the honest part of) some secure
protocol and P a process that implements the functionality speciﬁed by I.
The overall goal is to show that P realizes, without ﬂaws, (part of) the secure
functionality speciﬁed by I. The goal is achieved if for any real adversary,
say (a : A), the process P ||(a : A) is computationally indistinguishable by
the adversary a from the process I||(a : B) for some ideal adversary (a : B),
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where an ideal adversary is an adversary which cannot corrupt I and a real
adversary is any local process for agent a. This property asserts that given a
real adversary (a : A), agent a cannot distinguish the information leaked by
P ||(a : A) from the information leaked by the well behaved process I||(a : B)
for some ideal adversary (a : B), and therefore, we infer that P ||(a : A) is also
well behaved. This discussion leads to the concept of emulation with respect
to a set of real adversaries A and ideal adversaries B.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let P and I be process terms and A and B sets of global
processes where the only agent is the adversary a, then P emulates I with
respect to A and B if and only if for all processes (a : A) ∈ A there exists a
process (a : B) ∈ B such that P ||(a : A)  I||(a : B). In such case we write
P ≡aA,B I and say that P is a secure implementation of I with respect to A
and B.
A desirable property of the emulation relation is the so called Composi-
tion Theorem. This result was ﬁrst discussed informally for the classical secure
computation setting in [12], and states the following: if P is a secure imple-
mentation of part I of an ideal protocol, R and J are two protocols which use
the ideal protocol I as a component, and ﬁnally, R is a secure implementation
of J , then RIP should be a secure implementation of J . This result is captured
as follows:
Theorem 3.2 Let P, I be processes, R[ ] and J [ ] contexts and A,B sets of
processes over agent a and C,D sets of processes over agent b. If R[I||(a :
B)] ≡bC,D J [I||(a : B)] for any (a : B) ∈ B and P ≡
a
A,B I then for any
adversary (a : A) ∈ A there exists (a : B) ∈ B such that R[Q||(a : A)] ≡bC,D
J [I||(a : B)].
Proof. Let (a : A) ∈ A and (a : B) ∈ B be such that P ||(a : A) 
I||(a : B). Now choose some (b : C) ∈ C, clearly, R[Q||(a : A)]||(c :
C)  R[I||(a : B)]||(c : C) since  is a congruence relation. Moreover,
since R[I||(a : B)] ≡C,D J [I||(a : B)], there is a (b : D) ∈ D such that
R[I|(a : B)]|C  J [I||(a : B)]||(b : D). Finally, by transitivity of ,
we have that R[Q||(a : A)]||(b : C)  J [I||(a : B)]||(b : D) and hence
R[Q||(a : A)] ≡C,D J [I||(a : B)]. 
Observe that ideal protocols are constituted by a honest part I and an
ideal adversary (a : B), and therefore are of the form I||(a : B). This justiﬁes
why R[I||(a : B)] was considered in the proposition above instead of R[I].
Moreover, adversaries for the functionality implemented by R and J might be
diﬀerent from those of I and Q, therefore, two pairs of sets of processes C, D
and A, B are required to model two kinds of adversaries.
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4 Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs
An interactive proof is a two party protocol, where one agent is called the
prover and the other is called the veriﬁer. The main objective of the protocol
is to let the prover convince the veriﬁer of the validity of an assertion, however,
this must be done in such a way that the prover cannot convince the veriﬁer
of the validity of some false assertion.
Any interactive proof system fulﬁlls two properties: completeness and
soundness. Completeness states that if the assertion the prover wants to
convince the veriﬁer is true, then the veriﬁer should be convinced with prob-
ability one. On the other hand, soundness is fulﬁlled if the veriﬁer cannot
be convinced, up to a negligible probability, of a false assertion. Therefore,
completeness and soundness allow the veriﬁer to check whether the assertion
of the prover is true or false.
Zero-knowledge is a property of the prover (strategy). Consider the fol-
lowing informal notion of (quantum) computational zero-knowledge strategy,
which corresponds to the straightforward lifting to the quantum setting of the
classical version:
Deﬁnition 4.1 A prover strategy S is said to be quantum computational
zero-knowledge over a set L if and only if for every quantum polynomial-time
veriﬁer strategy, V there exists quantum polynomial-time algorithm M such
that (S, V )(l) is (quantum) computationally indistinguishable from M(l) for
all l ∈ L, where (S, V ) denotes the output of the interaction between S and
V .
The main application of zero-knowledge proof protocols in the crypto-
graphic setting is in the context of a user U that has a secret and is supposed
to perform some steps, depending on the secret. The problem is how can other
users assure that U has carried out the correct steps without U disclosing its
secret. Zero-knowledge proof protocols (ZKP) can be used to satisfy these
conﬂicting requirements.
Zero-knowledge essentially embodies that the veriﬁer cannot gain more
knowledge when interacting with the prover than by running alone a quantum
polynomial time program (using the same input in both cases). That is,
running a the veriﬁer in parallel with the prover should be indistinguishable
of some quantum polynomial time program.
Actually, the notion of (quantum computational) zero-knowledge proofs
can be captured through emulation very easily. Assuming that a proof strategy
S(x) and veriﬁer V (x) are modelled as terms of the process algebra, it is
actually possible to model the interaction between p and v by the process
(p : S)||(v : V ). Denote by Lv(l) the set of all process terms for the veriﬁer
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(v : V )xl , that is, any process term (v : V ) where the free variable x was
replaced by the binary word l. We have the following characterization:
Proposition 4.2 A process term (p : S) denoting a proof strategy is com-
putational zero-knowledge for L if and only if (p : S)xl ≡
v
Lv(l),Lv(l) 0, for all
l ∈ L.
Proof (Sketch): Notice that the ZKP resumes to impose that for all (v : V )xl
there is a process (v : V ′)xl such that (p : S)
x
l ||(v : V )
x
l  0||(v : V
′)xl . Since the
semantics of a local process can be modelled by a QPM, and moreover 0||(v :
V ′)xl can model any QPM, the characterization proposed in this proposition
is equivalent to Deﬁnition 4.1. 
So, a process (p : S) models a quantum zero-knowledge strategy if, from
the point of view of the veriﬁer, it is impossible to distinguish the ﬁnal result
of the interaction with (p : S) from the interaction with the 0 process. A clear
corollary of Theorem 3.2 is that, quantum zero-knowledge is compositional.
It is simple to adapt the emulation approach to several other quantum
security properties, like quantum secure computation, authentication and so
on.
5 Conclusions
The contributions of this paper are multiple. First, we introduced a process
algebra for specifying and reasoning about (quantum) security protocols. To
restrict the computation power of the agents to quantum polynomial-time, we
introduced the logarithm cost quantum random access machine, and incor-
porated it in the process language. Due to the special aspects of quantum
information, qubits were assumed to be partitioned among agents, and the
(quantum) computation of an agent was restricted to its own qubits.
Second, we deﬁned observational equivalence and quantum computational
indistinguishability for the process algebra at hand, and showed that the latter
is a congruence relation. Moreover, we obtained a simple corollary of this
result: security properties deﬁned via emulation are compositional.
Finally, we illustrated the deﬁnition of a security property via emulation
with the concept of quantum zero-knowledge. It is however straightforward to
adapt this approach to several other quantum security properties, like quan-
tum secure computation.
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